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Abstract—Cyber risks are the most common risks encountered by a modern network system. However, it is significantly difficult to
assess the joint cyber risk owing to the network topology, risk propagation, and heterogeneities of components. In this paper, we
propose a novel backward elimination approach for computing the joint cyber risk encountered by different types of components in a
network system; moreover, explicit formulas are also presented. Certain specific network topologies including complete, star, and
complete bi-partite topologies are studied. The effects of propagation depth and compromise probabilities on the joint cyber risk are
analyzed using stochastic comparisons. The variances and correlations of cyber risks are examined by a simulation experiment. It was
discovered that both variances and correlations change rapidly when the propagation depth increases from its initial value. Further,
numerical examples are also presented.
Index Terms—Backward elimination; Correlation; Network system; Scoring; Propagation model.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
N ETWORK systems have become an indispensable componentin modern society. They are important owing to the rapid
evolution of cyber infrastructure, which typically consists of
different processors, eStorage devices, sensors, and computers. For
example, a key component for operating the cyber infrastructure
is the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system,
which performs monitoring, analyzing, and controlling tasks by
using computers and networked data communications [5]. Another
example is the rapid development of the internet of things, which
relies on the cyber network system to connect and exchange data.
The network system consists of sensors, computers, e-devices,
and other objects to gather and share the information. While the
network systems are essential and beneficial to society, they en-
counter significant cyber risks [20], [21]. According to the Repos-
itory of Industrial Security Incidents (http://www.risidata.com/),
242 security incidents related to critical infrastructure and in-
dustrial control systems have occurred from 1982 to 2014 [12].
Therefore, there is an urgent demand for the methodologies to
assess the cyber risks of network systems, which is challenging
owing to the dependence among risks and heterogeneous nature
of the network system (i.e., different types of components).
In the literature, there are extensive studies on the risk as-
sessment of network systems [2], [26], [27], [28]. For instance,
Cherdantseva et al. [2] reviewed twenty-four risk assessment
methods pertaining to a SCADA system, and various approaches
were discussed. A comprehensive review of the studies on the
epidemic spreading over complex networks was presented in [13].
Although there are extensive models for studying the cyber risks
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of networked systems, the dependence among the risks were not
thoroughly understood despite its natural existence among the
cyber risks of network systems. For example, for a smart grid
with a SCADA system, the risks encountered by the computers
and phasor measurement units (PMUs) are highly correlated as
the attacks can propagate through the communication network.
The challenge existing in the dependence study is primarily
caused by the technique barrier as the network system typically
involves different types of components. There are only a few
works that analyze joint/dependent risks. Xu and Xu [25] proposed
a stochastic model to assess the risks of a network system, where
the stochastic renewal process was utilized to handle the joint
risk. Xu et al. [24] introduced the tool of copulas to accommodate
the dependencies among the cyber risks over a complex network,
where the copula is a statistical tool that can handle the nonlinear
dependence and is widely used in several different areas [6]. Qu
and Wang [16] developed a correlated heterogeneous susceptible-
infectious-susceptible (SIS) model over a network, where the
infection rates were assumed to be correlated to nodal degrees.
Laszka et al. [9] studied a correlated risk model over a network
system from the cyber insurance perspective, where the probability
distribution of the total number of compromised nodes within a
network was provided. To the best of our knowledge, none of
the existing studies have discussed the joint risk over a network
system with heterogeneous nodes, which is the main purpose of
this work.
To further understand the motivations for our study, consider
the synchrophasor data system of a smart grid, as illustrated in
Figure 1, which has three different types of components [15]: (i)
a PMU monitors the working status of a power grid by recording
the measurement data including voltage, current, frequency, and
phase angle; (ii) a phasor data concentrator (PDC) coverts the
phasor data obtained from multiple PMUs, which is outputted to
the data stream; further, the data can be transmitted to other PDCs
or to workstations; (iii) a workstation, where decisions are made
and operations performed based on the data from PDCs. As those
components are networked and the attacks can propagate over the
network, it is particuarly important to study the joint risk of the
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Fig. 1. Illustration of synchrophasor control system
different components. Specifically, the system defender is required
to know the information on the numbers of PMUs, PDCs, and
computers in the workstation that are compromised to assess the
risk of the entire system. For example, the risk level of the smart
grid in Figure 1 can be scored from zero to five based on the joint
risk levels listed in Table 1. The risk score is the highest (five) if
any of the computers in the workstation is compromised, all the
PMUs are compromised, or four PMUs and at least one PDC is
compromised. To develop a similar risk scoring system, the joint
distribution of risks is required, which is also the motivation for the
current work. Such a scoring system can be used by an insurance
company for the purpose of pricing.
TABLE 1
Sample risk scoring approach for the synchrophasor data system,
where X1 represents the number of compromised PMUs, X2
represents the number of compromised PDCs, and X3 denotes the
number of compromised computers in the workstation
Risk score (X1, X2, X3)
0 (0, 0, 0)
1 (1, 0, 0)
2 (2, 0, 0)
3 (3, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 2, 0)
4 (1,≥ 1, 0), (2,≥ 1, 0), (3,≥ 1, 0), (4, 0, 0)
5 (0, 0,≥ 1), (4,≥ 1, 0), (5, 0, 0)
In this paper, we present an analysis of the joint cyber risk
in a network system with heterogenous components. The main
contributions are summarized as follows.
• The explicit formulas of joint cyber risks are provided for
network systems with heterogenous components. Those
explicit solutions are particularly important for assessing
the joint risk of critical cyber components in a small
size network system. A novel backward elimination ap-
proach for computing the joint risk of a network system
is developed for this purpose. For a large-scale network
with heterogenous components, the proposed backward
elimination approach can be used to effectively simulate
the joint risks.
• A new cyber index (namely, propagation depth L) is intro-
duced. This new index L allows us to describe the power
of risk propagation or the defensive power of a network.
Specifically, the network defender can use this index to
determine the propagation power of a new risk (e.g., a
new malware). If L is large, the new risk is considered
to have more power for propagating over the network.
This index can also be used for assessing the defense
level of a company network. If a less contagious malware
can propagate more hops over a company network, the
defense level of the network can be marked as low. This
also helps the insurance company to determine the risk
score of the company who wants to purchase the cyber
insurance policy.
• We rigorously prove the effects of propagation parame-
ters on the cyber risk of a network with heterogenous
components via stochastic comparisons. The simulation
study is also presented to confirm the theoretical results
and provide new insights.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce the L-hop risk propagation model, and discuss the new
concept of propagation depth. Section 3 presents the joint cyber
risk of different types of nodes and the explicit formulas for
computing the joint distribution of varying numbers of multi-
type compromised nodes by using a novel backward elimination
approach. Certain special cases are also presented in this section.
In Section 4, we study the effects of propagation depth and
compromise probabilities on the joint cyber risk via stochastic
ordering. We perform a simulation study in Section 5 to assess
the joint cyber risk of a network system and obtain certain new
insights. In the last Section, we conclude our main results and
present some discussions.
2 L-HOP RISK PROPAGATION MODEL
2.1 Existing risk propagation models
There exists several risk propagation models in the literature,
which aim to understand the propagation dynamics. For example,
the well-known SIS and susceptible-infectious-recovered (SIR)
epidemic models [14] and their variations were widely studied
in the areas of biology, epidemiology, and cyber security [3], [4],
[23]. These models are used to describe the asymptotic steady
status of an epidemic in a population or a virus over a computer
network by employing certain stochastic process theories [22].
For comprehensive reviews of SIS, SIR, and their variations,
please refer to recent surveys [14], [23]. Another popular risk
propagation model was originally proposed from the perspective
of game theory [8] and generalized to a probabilistic model [7].
The generalized model is named as the one-hop model and is
further extended to the multi-hop model [9]. Specifically, the one-
hop model describes two types of risks encountered by a network.
First is the direct attack, i.e., risk from outside the network, where
a node is directly compromised by attacks, which includes the
drive-by-download attacks (i.e., a node is compromised because
its user visits a malicious website), or outside hacker attack (i.e.,
a node is directly compromised by the hacker). The second is
the indirect attack, i.e., risk from within the network, where a
node is compromised by attacks from its compromised neighbors.
These two types of risks are also called the pull- and push-based
risks, respectively, in the literature [24]. In a one-hop model, the
risk within the network only propagates one hop. Thus, a node
only encounters risks from the outside or its immediate neighbors.
Specifically, if a node i is directly compromised by the risk from
outside, it has the ability to propagate the risk to its healthy
neighbor j once with a probability qij . However, if the node is
indirectly compromised, it cannot propagate the risk. The multi-
hop model introduced in [9] allows a compromised node i to
propagate the risks irrespective of the node i being directly or
3indirectly compromised. Therefore, a compromised node i can
compromise its healthy neighbor j once with probability qij ,
irrespective of how the node i is compromised.
2.2 Proposed L-hop risk propagation model
In this section, we introduce the L-hop risk propagation model,
i.e., the risk from a direct attack, is allowed to propagate L hops
within the network. For the purpose of illustration, a 2-hop risk
propagation over a network is displayed in Figure 2. Nodes 1,
5, and 8 are directly compromised by the risks from outside the
network. Those nodes propagate the risks to their neighbors, and
compromise nodes 2, 4, and 9. The compromised nodes 2, 4, 9
further propagate the risks to their neighbors, and compromise
nodes 7 and 12.
Fig. 2. A 2-hop risk propagation over a network. Blue color represents
the healthy nodes. Red color represents the nodes (1, 5, and 8) that are
compromised directly by the risk from outside the network. Gold color
represents the nodes (2, 4, and 9) that are compromised by the directly-
compromised nodes. Grey color represents the nodes (7 and 12) that
are compromised by their infected neighbors.
The following reasons motivate us to introduce the L-hop risk
propagation model.
• The propagation cannot be unlimited for most of cyber
networks. Theoretically, the propagation depth is at most
the length of the longest path between two nodes in the
network. Hence, the L-hop model is a natural extension
of the multi-hop model, with L equal to the length of the
longest path between two nodes in a network. Practically,
the propagation will be stopped by the network defender
after the compromise is detected on the network.
• The propagation depth L provides a new index for as-
sessing the cyber risk of network system. Specifically, the
network defender can use this index to determine the prop-
agation power of a new risk (e.g., a new malware). If L is
large, the new risk is considered to have more power for
propagating over the network. From the other hand, this
index can also be used for assessing the defense level of
a company network. That is, if a less contagious malware
can propagate more hops over a company network, the
defense level of the network can be marked as low. This
would be particularly useful for the insurance company to
perform the risk scoring.
• It should be noted that the L-hop risk propagation model
is a nontrivial extension to the one-hop model as the
propagation depth L can significantly affect the dynamics
of risk propagation. In [9], it was argued that the L-
hop model can be regarded as a certain one-hop model
with a power matrix of indirect compromise probabilities
between nodes. Unfortunately, this perspective is incor-
rect. This is simply because that the matrix of indirect
compromise probabilities with certain power may not be a
probability matrix (see Section 3 for a specific example).
It is interesting to see that the L-hop model can be connected
to the L-hop percolation model in the literature of cyber security
[18], [19]. The L-hop percolation model can characterize the sce-
nario of a network under attack by a computer malware and under
the control of a bot master. The network defender can directly
detect and delete certain bots (i.e., compromised nodes) and can
trace the risk from the bots within their L-hop neighborhood and
remove them [18]. Although both L-hop risk propagation and
percolation models consider the risk propagation over L hops, the
proposed risk propagation focuses on the propagation dynamics
from the perspective of risk management while the percolation
model focuses on the strategies for removing the risk, i.e., from
the perspective of network defense.
3 JOINT CYBER RISK OF A NETWORK SYSTEM
In this section, we analyze the joint cyber risk of heterogeneous
nodes under the L-hop risk propagation model, namely, the
multivariate distribution of numbers of multi-type compromised
nodes.
We consider an undirected finite network graph G(V,E),
where V = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of nodes with size N = |V |,
and E = {eij : i, j ∈ V } is the set of edges. We assume that
G has M different types of nodes, such as abstract computers,
e-devices, and e-components. Let Si be the set of all type i
nodes with |Si| = Ni > 0, i = 1, . . . ,M , S =
⋃M
i=1 Si, and∑M
i=1Ni = N .
Let p be the direct compromise probability vector
p = (p1, . . . , pN ),
where pi represents the probability that node i is compromised by
the direct attack, i = 1, . . . , N . Let Q be the indirect compromise
probability matrix, i.e.,
Q = (qij) ∈ [0, 1]N×N ,
where element qij denotes the probability that node j is compro-
mised by the indirect attack from node i, where i, j = 1, . . . , N ,
with qij = 0 for i = j.
In the subsequent discussion, we assume that all random com-
promise events are statistically independent. We denote a¯ = 1−a
for any a ∈ R; A¯ is the complement of any set A; further, A\B
is the difference set of A and B. The following conventional
notations are also used throughout the paper.
00 = 1,
∑
∅
= 0,
∏
∅
= 1,
(
n
m
)
= 0 for m < 0 or m > n.
3.1 Backward elimination approach for a general case
Let Xi be the number of compromised nodes in Si for i =
1, . . . ,M . Subsequently, we discuss the procedure to compute
the joint probability of varying numbers of compromised nodes.
To facilitate the discussion, we denote
EU = {eij ∈ E : i, j ∈ U}, U ⊂ V.
4Let RG(U)(C,D;L) denote the conditional probability that only
all nodes of C are compromised provided that all nodes of D are
compromised directly over the network G(U,EU ), where D ⊂
C ⊂ U .
Theorem 3.1. For L ≥ 1, the joint probability mass function of
random vector (X1, . . . , XM ) is,
f(x1, . . . , xM )
=
∑
C1⊂S1
|C1|=x1
· · ·
∑
CM⊂SM
|CM |=xM
∑
D0⊂C ∏
j∈D0
pj ·
∏
i∈D0
p¯i ·RG(V )(C, D0;L)
 , (3.1)
where 0 ≤ xi ≤ Ni, C = ∪Mi=1Ci, and
a) for L = 1,
RG(V )(C, D0; 1)
=
∏
i∈C\D0
1− ∏
j∈D0
q¯ji
 ∏
v∈D0,l∈C
q¯vl; (3.2)
b) for L ≥ 2,
RG(V )(C, D0;L)
=
∑
Dj⊂C\Dj−1
j=1,...,L−1
L−2∏
i=0
RG(V \Di−1)(Di ∪Di+1, Di; 1)
·RG(V \DL−2)(C\DL−2, DL−1; 1) (3.3)
with Dk = ∪kl=0Dl for k = 0, . . . , L− 1, and D−1 = ∅.
Proof We define the events as:
BC = {Only nodes in C are compromised for L-hop propagation}
and
AD = {Only nodes in D are directly compromised}
for C,D ⊂ V .
When 0 ≤ xi ≤ Ni, i = 1, . . . ,M ,
P (X1 = x1, . . . , XM = xM ) =
∑
C1⊂S1
|C1|=x1
· · ·
∑
CM⊂SM
|CM |=xM
P (BC) ,
where Ci represents the set of type i nodes with the cardinality
xi, and C = ∪Mi=1Ci. Now, we consider whether the nodes are
directly compromised. Considering the condition on the directly
compromised nodes,
P (BC) =
∑
D0⊂C
P (BC |AD0) P (AD0) ,
where
P (AD0) =
∏
j∈D0
pj ·
∏
i∈D0
p¯i.
It is to be noted that
P(BC |AD0) = RG(V ) (C, D0;L) .
For L = 1, only the propagation from the directly compromised
nodes to their neighbors is permitted. Therefore, the probability
that the nodes in C\D0 are compromised indirectly by D0 is
∏
i∈C\D0
1− ∏
j∈D0
q¯ji
 ,
and the probability that the nodes in C are not compromised by
D0 is
∏
v∈D0,l∈C q¯vl. Thus,
RG(V )(C, D0; 1) =
∏
l∈C\D0
(1−
∏
j∈D0
q¯jl)
∏
i∈D0,h∈C
q¯ih. (3.4)
For L ≥ 2, the computation of the key component P(BC |AD)
is significantly complex. To overcome the computational com-
plexity, we introduce the following novel backward elimination
approach for computing the joint probability mass function.
The idea of backward elimination is motivated from the
perspective of dynamic propagation. Thus, we consider the L-hop
propagation as L rounds of propagation. We define B(m)C as the
event that only the nodes of C are compromised after m rounds of
propagations for 1 ≤ m ≤ L and C ⊂ V . Note that B(L)C ≡ BC .
Let us consider the first round of propagation. By conditioning
on the exact number of compromised nodes in C\D0 after the first
round of propagation, by the law of total probability, the following
is satisfied:
RG(V )(C, D0;L)
= P
(
B
(L)
C |AD0
)
=
∑
D1⊂C\D0
P
(
B
(L)
C |B(1)D1 , AD0
)
P
(
B
(1)
D1
|AD0
)
,(3.5)
where
P
(
B
(1)
D1
|AD0
)
= RG(V )(D1 ∪D0, D0; 1). (3.6)
The conditional probability
P
(
B
(L)
C |B(1)D1 , AD0
)
can be efficiently computed by using the backward elimination
approach as follows. After the first round of propagation, nodes in
D0 and all the edges from D0 to V \D0 are eliminated as those
elements do not play a role in the second round of propagation.
Therefore, the networkG(V ) reduces to a subnetworkG(V \D0).
Given B(1)D1 (i.e., only the nodes in D1 ∈ C\D0 are compromised
in the first round), the event that the nodes in C are compromised
owing to AD0 after L rounds of propagations is equivalent to that
of the nodes in C\D0 being compromised by the nodes in D1
over the network G(V \D0) after L − 1 rounds of propagations
(namely, B(L−1)C\D0 |AD1 ). Thus,
P
(
B
(L)
C |B(1)D1 , AD0
)
= RG(V \D0)(C\D0, D1;L− 1). (3.7)
Substituting (3.6) and (3.7) into (3.5) yields
RG(V )(C, D0;L)
=
∑
D1⊂C\D0
RG(V )(D1 ∪D0, D0; 1)
·RG(V \D0)(C\D0, D1;L− 1). (3.8)
After L − 1 iterations of (3.8), the explicit expression can be
written as:
5RG(V )(C, D0;L)
=
∑
D1⊂C\D0
∑
D2⊂C\D1
· · ·
∑
DL−1⊂C\DL−2
L−2∏
i=0
RG(V \Di−1)(Di ∪Di+1, Di; 1)
·RG(V \DL−2)(C\DL−2, DL−1; 1),
where Dk = ∪kl=0Dl for k = 0, . . . , L− 1, and D−1 = ∅.
The required result is presented subsequently.
Theorem 3.1 provides explicit formulas for computing the joint
probability for the varying numbers of multi-type compromised
nodes with a propagation depthL. It should be emphasized that the
primary expression in Eq. (3.3) only considers the case of L = 1,
which is readily satisfied in Eq. (3.2). Hence, the joint probability
can be effectively computed from Eq. (3.1). In particular, Theorem
3.1 provides an explicit formula for a special case of a multi-hop
model (i.e., L is the length of the largest path of a network).
The key idea for deriving the explicit expressions for the joint
probability is the proposed backward elimination approach. To
further explain the idea of the backward elimination approach,
we consider the two-hop risk propagation illustrated in Figure 2.
At the initial stage (i.e., stage 0), we assume that the network
only includes the directly compromised nodes (i.e., 1, 5, 8), as
illustrated in Figure 3(a). Let us assume that these compromised
nodes indirectly compromise nodes 2, 4, 9 successfully at stage 1.
The idea of backward elimination is to remove nodes 1, 5, 8, and
the edges {e12, e54, e56, e82, e89, e810} as those nodes and edges
do not play a role in the subsequent propagation. Then, we obtain
a smaller network, as shown in Figure 3(b). As the propagation
depth is L = 2, nodes 2, 4, and 9 further compromise nodes 7 and
12 at stage 2. Now, we can remove nodes 2, 4, 9, and the edges
{e27, e23, e43, e96, e912, e911}, which results in a much smaller
network, as illustrated in Figure 3(c).
In [9], it was stated that the L-hop model with indirect
compromise probability matrix Q can be regarded as the one-
hop model with indirect compromise probability matrix QL.
Unfortunately, this statement is incorrect as QL may not even
be a probability matrix. For example, consider the homogeneous
model with N = 4, L = 2, qij = 0.8 for 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 4, and
qii = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. It can be seen that all of off-diagonal
components of Q2 are 1.28, which means that Q2 can not be a
matrix of indirect compromise probabilities.
3.2 Special cases
In this section, we discuss certain specific network topologies
for which the multivariate distributions of varying numbers of
compromised nodes have simpler forms.
3.2.1 Complete network
Consider a complete graph network consisting of M types of
nodes with
∑M
i=1Ni = N . We further assume that the com-
promise probabilities are homogeneous; therefore,
pl = p, qij = q, (3.9)
for l ∈ {1, . . . , N} and i 6= j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Note that the conditional probability RG(U)(C,D;L) now
only depends on |C| and |D| for this case. To simplify the
notations, we define RKu(c, d;L) as the conditional probability
that only certain c−d nodes are compromised indirectly, provided
that certain d nodes are compromised directly over a complete
network Ku with u nodes, where d ≤ c ≤ u. Owing to the
symmetry, Eqs. (3.2), (3.8), and (3.3) can be simplified as
RKu(c, d; 1) = (1− q¯d)c−dq¯d(u−c), (3.10)
RKu(c, d;L) =
c−d∑
i=0
(
c− d
i
)
RKu(d+ i, d; 1)
·RKu−d(c− d, i;L− 1), (3.11)
and
RKu(c, d;L)
=
c−d∑
d1=0
c−δ1∑
d2=0
· · ·
c−δL−2∑
dL−1=0
L−2∏
j=0
(
c− δj
dj+1
)
(1− q¯dj )dj+1
·q¯dj(u−δj+1)(1− q¯dL−1)c−δL−1 q¯dL−1(u−c) (3.12)
with δk = d+
∑k
i=1 di for k = 0, . . . , L− 1 and δ−1 = 0.
Then, we derive the following result for a network with
complete topology and homogeneous compromise probabilities.
Proposition 3.2. Under the assumption (3.9), for a given L ≥ 1,
the following equation is satisfied:
f(x1, . . . , xM ) =
M∏
i=1
(
Ni
xi
)
χ∑
d=0
(
χ
d
)[
pdp¯N−dRKN (χ, d;L)
]
with χ =
∑M
i=1 xi, where RKN (χ, d;L) can be computed
by (3.10) and (3.12) for L = 1 and L ≥ 2, respectively.
3.2.2 Star network
Consider a star network with one hub and N − 1 leaves. The
nodes can be divided into two categories: hub (type I) and leaves
(type II), i.e., M = 2. We define the compromise probability as
follows. Let pI(pII) denote the probability of direct compromise
of the hub (a leaf), and qI,II (qII,I ) denote the probability that
a leaf (the hub) is compromised by the hub (a leaf). Note that
for a star network, the propagation depth L is at most two. From
Theorem 3.1, we have the following closed forms of the joint mass
functions for the joint risk.
Proposition 3.3. For a star network with the aforementioned two
types of nodes, we have:
a) for L = 1, the joint mass function of (X1, X2) is given
by
f(0,m) =
(
N − 1
m
)
pmII p¯I p¯
N−1−m
II q¯
m
II,I
and
f(1,m)
=
(
N − 1
m
)
pmII p¯I p¯
N−1−m
II (1− q¯mII,I)
+
(
N − 1
m
)
m∑
d=0
(
m
d
)
pIp
d
II p¯
N−1−d
II q
m−d
I,II q¯
N−1−m
I,II ;
b) for L = 2, the joint mass function of (X1, X2) is given
by
f(0,m) =
(
N − 1
m
)
p¯Ip
m
II p¯
N−1−m
II q¯
m
II,I ;
6(a) Stage 0
(b) Stage 1 (c) Stage 2
Fig. 3. Illustration of the backward elimination approach
moreover, for 0 ≤ m ≤ N − 1,
f(1,m) =
(
N − 1
m
)
·
(
m∑
d=1
(
m
d
)
p¯Ip
d
II p¯
N−1−d
II (1− q¯dII,I)q¯N−1−mI,II qm−dI,II
+
m∑
d=0
(
m
d
)
pIp
d
II p¯
N−1−d
II q¯
N−1−m
I,II q
m−d
I,II
)
.
3.2.3 Complete bi-partite network
A complete bi-partite graph KN1,N2 consists of two disjoint sets
S1 and S2 containing corresponding N1 and N2 nodes, such that
all nodes in S1 are connected to all nodes in S2, while within each
set there are no connections.
We assume that the direct compromise probabilities of nodes
in each set are the same, i.e., pi ≡ pI and pj ≡ pII , for all
i ∈ S1 and j ∈ S2, and the propagation probability from any
node in S1 (S2) to any node in S2 (S1) is the same, denoted by
qI,II (qII,I ). Then, for the one-hop prorogation, we derive the
subsequent result.
Proposition 3.4. Assume a complete bi-partite network with
disjoint sets S1 and S2. For propagation depth L = 1, the
joint probability mass function of (X1, X2) is given by
f(m1,m2)
=
(
N1
m1
)(
N2
m2
)
m1∑
d1=0
m2∑
d2=0
{(
m1
d1
)(
m2
d2
)
pd1I p
d2
II
·(1− pI)N1−d1(1− pII)N2−d2
·
[
1− (1− qI,II)d1
]m2−d2 · [1− (1− qII,I)d2]m1−d1
·(1− qI,II)d1(N2−m2) · (1− qII,I)d2(N1−m1)
}
,
for 0 ≤ m1 ≤ N1 and 0 ≤ m2 ≤ N2.
To conclude this section, we present an example illustrating
the backward elimination approach. For simplicity, we consider
the case of a complete network with homogeneous compromise
probabilities.
Example 3.5. Consider a complete graph network with N = 5
nodes. Assume that there are two types of nodes: S1 = {1, 2}
and S2 = {3, 4, 5}; further, the propagation depth is L = 2.
We assume that for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 5,
pi = p, qij = q.
Subsequently, we compute the joint mass function of
(X1, X2). First, it is easy to see that
f(0, 0) = p¯5.
Further, by Proposition 3.2, we derive
f(1, 0) = 2× [p¯5RK5(1, 0;L) + pp¯4RK5(1, 1;L)] .
7Note that the indirect compromise probability is homogeneous;
thus, we obtain
RK5(1, 0; 2) = 0, RK5(1, 1; 2) = q¯
4.
Then, we calculate that
f(1, 0) = 2pp¯4q¯4.
Similarly, we have
f(0, 1) = 3pp¯4q¯4.
To maintain conciseness, we only compute the expression of
f(1, 1) for the illustration. Using Proposition 3.2, we derive
the following expression
f(1, 1) = 6× [2pp¯4RK5(2, 1; 2) + p2p¯3RK5(2, 2; 2)] .(3.13)
Applying Eq. (3.12), it follows that
RK5(2, 1; 2) = qq¯
4RK4(1, 0; 1) + qq¯
3RK4(1, 1; 1)
and
RK5(2, 2; 2) = q¯
6RK3(0, 0; 1).
Using Eq. (3.10), we also calculate:
RK4(1, 0; 1) = 0, RK4(1, 1; 1) = q¯
3,
and
RK3(0, 0; 1) = 1.
Therefore,
RK5(2, 1; 2) = qq¯
6, (3.14)
RK5(2, 2; 2) = q¯
6. (3.15)
Substituting (3.14) and (3.15) into (3.13) yields
f(1, 1) = 6× (2pp¯4qq¯6 + p2p¯3q¯6) .
The other cases can be computed similarly.
Table 2 lists the joint probabilities of (X1, X2) for p = 0.2
and q = 0.1 with L = 2, 3, 4 (note that L = 4 demon-
strates a multi-hop model). It can be observed that when L
TABLE 2
Joint probability for p = 0.2, q = 0.1, and L = 2, 3, 4.
X1X2 0 1 2 3 Total
L = 2
0 0.3277 0.1612 0.0588 0.0131 0.5608
1 0.1075 0.1175 0.0788 0.0245 0.3283
2 0.0196 0.0394 0.0367 0.0152 0.1109
Total 0.4548 0.3181 0.1743 0.0528
L = 3
0 0.3277 0.1612 0.0588 0.0126 0.5603
1 0.1075 0.1175 0.0755 0.0255 0.326
2 0.0196 0.0377 0.0383 0.0181 0.1137
Total 0.4548 0.3164 0.1726 0.0562
L = 4
0 0.3277 0.1612 0.0588 0.0126 0.5603
1 0.1075 0.1175 0.0755 0.0253 0.3258
2 0.0196 0.0377 0.0380 0.0186 0.1139
Total 0.4548 0.3164 0.1723 0.0565
increases, the joint probability of compromising more nodes
demonstrates an overall increasing trend. For example, when
L = 2, we observe P (X1 = 2, X2 = 3) = 0.0152, which
increases to 0.0181 for L = 3, and to 0.0186 for L = 4.
In particular, the probability of P (X1 = 2) increases from
0.1109 for L = 2 to 0.1139 for L = 4, and the probability of
P (X2 = 3) increases from 0.0528 for L = 2 to 0.0565 for
L = 4. This observation is confirmed by the theoretical results
obtained in Section 4.
4 EFFECTS OF PROPAGATION PARAMETERS
In this section, we discuss how the propagation depth L, direct
infection probability vector p, and indirect compromise proba-
bility matrix Q affect the joint distribution of the number of
compromised nodes. Intuitively, the joint risk of nodes over the
network should increase with increasing values of L, p, and Q. In
the following, we provide rigorous mathematical proofs to verify
those intuitions via the tool of stochastic orders, which has been
widely used in statistics, operation research, risk management, and
several other areas [11], [17].
We first recall the following multivariate stochastic order [17].
Definition 4.1. Suppose X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Y =
(Y1, . . . , Yn) are two random vectors. Then, random vector X
is said to be smaller than Y in the usual multivariate stochastic
order (denoted by X ≤st Y) if E[φ(X)] ≤ E[φ(Y)] for all
nondecreasing functions φ.
It should be noted that [17]:
X ≤st Y⇒ P(X1 ≤ x1, . . . , Xn ≤ xn) ≥ P(Y1 ≤ x1, . . . , Yn ≤ xn)
and
X ≤st Y⇒ P(X1 > x1, . . . , Xn > xn) ≤ P(Y1 > x1, . . . , Yn > xn).
Let (X1, . . . , XM |L,p, Q) be the number vector of the
compromised nodes for the given parameters L, p, and Q. The
following result shows that if the propagation depth L is larger,
there are more compromised nodes in the sense of the multivariate
stochastic order.
Theorem 4.2. We assume a network has M types of nodes,
with a propagation depth L, direct compromise probability
vector p, and indirect compromise probability matrixQ. Then,
the random vector (X1, . . . , XM ) increases with increasing
values of L in the sense of multivariate stochastic order, i.e.,
for L ≤ L′,
(X1, . . . , XM |L,p, Q) ≤st (X1, . . . , XM |L′,p, Q) ;
and hence,
[Xi|L,p, Q] ≤st [Xi|L′,p, Q] , i = 1, . . . ,M,
and [
M∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣L,p, Q
]
≤st
[
M∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣L′,p, Q
]
.
Proof Note that for the network under cyber threats, the set of
compromised nodes in the L-hop model is always a subset of
that in the (L+ 1)-hop model. This is because the propagation is
allowed to propagate one more step. Therefore,
(X1, . . . , XM |L,p, Q) ≤a.s. (X1, . . . , XM |L+ 1,p, Q) ,
where a.s. represents “almost surely”. According to Theorem
6.B.1 in [17],
(X1, . . . , XM |L,p, Q) ≤st (X1, . . . , XM |L+ 1,p, Q) ,
8which further implies
[Xi|L,p, Q] ≤st [Xi|L′,p, Q] , i = 1, . . . ,M,
and [
M∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣L,p, Q
]
≤st
[
M∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣L′,p, Q
]
.
Theorem 4.2 verifies the intuition that if the risk has more
power to propagate, i.e., the propagation depth L is larger, then
more nodes over the network will be compromised. It further
shows that the number of compromised nodes is always larger
when L is larger for each type. In particular, for L ≤ L′,
P(X1 ≤ x1, . . . , XM ≤ xm|L,p, Q)
≥ P(X1 ≤ x1, . . . , XM ≤ xm|L′,p, Q).
This implies that the joint distribution function of the number
of compromised nodes decreases when the propagation depth
increases. Similarly, for L ≤ L′,
P(X1 > x1, . . . , XM > xm|L,p, Q)
≥ P(X1 > x1, . . . , XM > xm|L′,p, Q).
This indicates that the joint survival function of the number
of compromised nodes increases (i.e., a more sever network
environment) when the propagation depth increases. These results
coincide with the findings listed in Table 2.
Subsequently, we analyze how the direct and indirect proba-
bilities affect the number of compromised nodes.
Theorem 4.3. We assume a network has M types of nodes, with
a propagation depth L, direct compromise probability vector
p, and indirect compromise probability matrix Q. Then, the
random vector (X1, . . . , XM ) increases when:
a) p increases in the sense of the multivariate stochastic
order, i.e., for p ≤ p′,
(X1, . . . , XM |L,p, Q) ≤st (X1, . . . , XM |L,p′, Q);
b) Q increases in the sense of the multivariate stochastic
order, i.e., for Q ≤ Q′,
(X1, . . . , XM |L,p, Q) ≤st (X1, . . . , XM |L,p, Q′).
Proof The proof is determined by using the coupling method in
probability theory [10].
a) Considering a network A, let Ij be a Bernoulli random vari-
able with Ij,A = 1, which represents that node j is compromised
successfully by a direct attack; then,
P(Ij,A = 1) = pj , j = 1, . . . , N.
Now, we construct a new network B with the same types of
nodes, a propagation depthL, and indirect compromise probability
matrix Q. We assume that the new network B has a different
direct compromise probability vector p′ ≥ p. The vector p′
is constructed as follows. Let Ij,B represent a node j that is
successfully compromised by a direct attack over network B. We
define that if Ij,A = 1, then Ij,B = 1; if Ij,A = 0, then Ij,B = 1
with probability (p′j − pj)/(1− pj). Then,
P(Ij,B = 1) = p
′
j .
Therefore, (
XA1 , . . . , X
A
M
)
≤a.s.
(
XB1 , . . . , X
B
M
)
,
which implies that(
XA1 , . . . , X
A
M
)
≤st
(
XB1 , . . . , X
B
M
)
,
where XA(B)i represents the number of type i compromised nodes
in network A(B), i = 1, . . . ,M . Therefore, this is proved.
b) Similar to the proof of a), we use Ilj,A = 1 to represent the
node j, which is compromised by node l in network A. Then,
P(Ilj,A = 1) = qlj .
Then, we construct a new network C with the same types of
nodes, a propagation depth L, and direct compromise probability
vector p. We assume that the new network C has a different
indirect compromise probability matrix Q′ ≥ Q. The matrix Q′
is constructed as follows. Let Ilj,C represent a node j, which
is successfully compromised by an indirect attack from node j
in network C . We define that if Ilj,A = 1, then Ilj,C = 1; if
Ilj,A = 0, then Ilj,C = 1, with probability (q′lj − qlj)/(1− qlj).
Then,
P(Ilj,C = 1) = q
′
lj .
Therefore, (
XA1 , . . . , X
A
M
)
≤a.s.
(
XC1 , . . . , X
C
M
)
,
which implies that(
XA1 , . . . , X
A
M
)
≤st
(
XC1 , . . . , X
C
M
)
.
Thus, the required proof is obtained.
Theorem 4.3 implies that when the direct compromise prob-
ability increases (e.g., the hacker launches attacks towards newly
discovered vulnerabilities of a software or an operating system),
more nodes over the network will be compromised. Theorem
4.3 further indicates that all types of nodes have a joint larger
probability of being compromised, namely, for p ≤ p′,
P(X1 > x1, . . . , XM > xm|L,p, Q)
≤ P(X1 > x1, . . . , XM > xm|L,p′, Q).
Similarly, when the indirect compromise probability increases
(e.g., the malware is very contagious or the network defense is
very weak), more nodes will be compromised. Particularly, all
types of nodes have a joint larger probability of being compro-
mised.
To sum, we rigorously show that both propagation depth and
compromise probabilities (direct or indirect) demonstrate signifi-
cant effects on the joint cyber risk of a network in the sense of the
multivariate stochastic order. When the propagation depth is larger,
all types of nodes have larger probabilities of being compromised.
Either direct or indirect compromise probability can increase the
joint cyber risk of a network.
5 SIMULATION STUDY
In this section, we perform a simulation study to assess the
joint cyber risk of a network system with heterogeneous nodes.
There are three main purposes: (i) The first is to validate the
theoretical results in Section 4. (ii) The second is to provide
some new insights on the correlation among risks which are
9measured via popular dependence measures including Pearson
correlation (Pearson), Kendall’s tau (Kendall), and Spearman’s
rho (Spearman) [6]. (iii) The third is to study the joint cyber risk
of a large-scale network via the proposed backward elimination
simulation when the explicit computing is infeasible.
We generate a scale-free network with 200 nodes according
to Barabasi–Albert model [1]. We first set five initial nodes,
and then each new node is randomly connected to two existing
nodes with probabilities proportional to the degrees of the existing
nodes. The generated graph is shown in Figure 4. We choose
20 nodes with the top highest degrees as the type I nodes, and
others as the type II nodes. The degrees of the type I nodes are:
49,38,37,35,35,33,32,30,28,24,24,21,19,18,17,16,16,15,15,15.
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Fig. 4. Scale-free network with 200 nodes, where the red color nodes
represent the type I nodes, and the others are type II nodes
Let Xi denote the varying numbers of compromised nodes of
type i, i = 1, 2, and X = X1 + X2. For simplicity, we assume
that the direct compromise probabilities are the same for each
type, i.e., pI and pII for type I and type II nodes, respectively.
Similarly, we assume that the indirect compromise probabilities
are the same for each type, i.e., qI and qII for type I and type II
nodes, respectively.
Algorithm 1 is used to simulate the number of compromised
nodes. The simulation algorithm is primarily based on the pro-
posed backward elimination approach. In Algorithm 1, for a given
L, all the compromised nodes for every depth 1 ≤ l ≤ L are
recorded (lines 14 and 16); thus, obtaining all the different results
for l. The experiment is performed based on 100, 000 Monte Carlo
simulations.
5.1 Propagation depth
Figure 5 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations
of proportions of compromised nodes under different scenarios.
It is seen from Figures 5(a), 5(d), and 5(g) that the means of
proportions of compromised nodes increase with the propagation
depth L for both type I and type II nodes. In particular, we observe
that the means of proportions of compromised nodes increases
dramatically from L = 1 to L = 2 (around 25% to 40%).
However, when L increases from 4 to 20 or more, the mean of
proportions of compromised nodes only varies marginally. This
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for simulating compromised nodes via
the back elimination approach.
INPUT: network graphG(V,E); number of nodesN ; propagation
depth L; directly compromise probability vector p; propagation
probability matrix Q; number of iterations K
OUTPUT: Simulated number of compromised nodes of all
types
1: for k ∈ 1 : K do
2: Determine the nodes that are directly compromised, i.e.,
generate Bernoulli random vector (I1, . . . , IN ) with prob-
ability p, and let U0 = {i : Ii = 1} denote the set of
compromised nodes;
3: for h ∈ 1 : L do
4: for j ∈ V \U0 do
5: Determine whether node j is compromised by the
nodes in U0 with propagation probability matrix Q,
i.e., generate independent Bernoulli random variables
Il,j with probabilities qlj , l ∈ U0;
6: if Node j is compromised, i.e., maxl∈U0{Ilj} = 1;
then
7: Record the new compromised nodes into set Uh ;
8: end if
9: end for
10: Count the number of compromised nodes for each type
in Uh, denoted by
(
u
(k)
h,1, . . . , u
(k)
h,M
)
;
11: Update V ← V \U0, i.e., by removing the nodes U0
from V , and all the edges connecting U0;
12: Update U0 ← Uh;
13: end for
14: Compute the number of compromised nodes for
each round and type as
(
x
(k)
l,1 , . . . , x
(k)
l,M
)
=(∑l
h=0 u
(k)
h,1, . . . ,
∑l
h=0 u
(k)
h,M
)
, l = 1, . . . , L;
15: end for
16: return
(
x
(k)
l,1 , . . . , x
(k)
l,M
)
, k = 1, . . . ,K , l = 1, . . . , L.
is primarily because the dynamic of compromise has attained
a relatively steady state. For type I nodes, almost all nodes are
compromised, while for type II nodes, there are still a few healthy
nodes. This suggests that the propagation depth L has a significant
effect on the number of compromised nodes.
While considering the standard deviation from Figures 5(b),
5(e), and 5(h), it is observed that for a smaller L (namely, 1 and
2), the standard deviations of the proportions of compromised
nodes are larger for both types. This is because, when L is
small, the varying numbers of compromised nodes could be quite
different. However, when L is larger (say, greater or equal to
4), the standard deviation is smaller, owing to the fact that the
dynamic of compromise has become a relatively steady state, i.e.,
the proportions of compromised nodes are nearly the same. We
conclude that the propagation depth L has a significant effect on
the standard deviations of proportions of compromised nodes.
For the correlations between the proportions of compromised
nodes of both types, it is observed from Figures 5(c), 5(f), and
5(i) that the correlation is larger when L is small as measured
by the three dependence measures. When L is larger, the cor-
relation becomes smaller. This observations can be explained as
follows: when L is smaller, a larger proportion of compromised
type I nodes should be associated with a larger proportion of
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Fig. 5. Means, standard deviations (SD), and correlations (Corr.) of proportions of compromised nodes for different parameters ζ = (pI , pII , qI , qII).
compromised type II nodes; when L is large, the proportions of
compromised nodes for both types are relatively stable, which
results in a smaller correlation.
5.2 Compromise probabilities
From Figure 6, it is seen that all the probability curves are
unimodal and they shift to the right when L is large. In particular,
we observe that the probability curves have the largest peak
values for L = 10. Comparing the Figures 6(a), 6(b) and 6(c)
to those corresponding ones in the second row of Figure 6, it is
observed that the larger indirect compromise probabilities cause
the probability curves shifting to the right. This implies that
when the indirect compromise probabilities increase, more nodes
are compromised. Comparing the Figures 6(a), 6(b) and 6(c) to
those corresponding ones in the third row of Figure 6, the similar
conclusion can be drawn for the direct compromise probabilities.
These observations validate the theoretical results of Theorem 4.3.
5.3 Joint cyber risks
To assess the joint cyber risks of type I and type II nodes, we
display the contour plots of the joint probabilities of compromised
nodes in Figure 7 with
(pI , pII , qI , qII) = (0.05, 0.15, 0.2, 0.3).
Figure 7(a) shows the contour plot for the case of L = 1. It is
observed that the proportions of compromised nodes of different
types demonstrate a clear positive correlation. Thus, when the
proportion of type I compromised nodes increases, the proportion
11
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Prop. of compromised nodes
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
L=1
L=2
L=10
(a) Type I, ζ = (0.05, 0.15, 0.2, 0.3)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
08
0.
10
Prop. of compromised nodes
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
L=1
L=2
L=10
(b) Type II, ζ = (0.05, 0.15, 0.2, 0.3)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
08
0.
10
Prop. of compromised nodes
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
L=1
L=2
L=10
(c) Total, ζ = (0.05, 0.15, 0.2, 0.3)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Prop. of compromised nodes
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
L=1
L=2
L=10
(d) Type I, ζ = (0.05, 0.15, 0.4, 0.5)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
08
0.
10
Prop. of compromised nodes
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
L=1
L=2
L=10
(e) Type II, ζ = (0.05, 0.15, 0.4, 0.5)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
08
0.
10
Prop. of compromised nodes
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
L=1
L=2
L=10
(f) Total, ζ = (0.05, 0.15, 0.4, 0.5)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Prop. of compromised nodes
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
L=1
L=2
L=10
(g) Type I, ζ = (0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
08
0.
10
Prop. of compromised nodes
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
L=1
L=2
L=10
(h) Type II, ζ = (0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
08
0.
10
Prop. of compromised nodes
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
L=1
L=2
L=10
(i) Total, ζ = (0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3)
Fig. 6. Probability plots of proportions of compromised nodes for different ζ = (pI , pII , qI , qII) and L = 1, 2, 10
of type II compromised nodes also increases. By comparing Figure
7(a) and Figure 7(b), we observe that there also exists a positive
dependence between the compromised proportions. It is very clear
that the joint risk significantly increases when L = 2. Figure 7(c)
shows the contour plot for the case of L = 10. It is observed that
the joint risk is the highest among all the cases. However, it does
not show any clear positive dependence pattern between two types
of nodes, which coincides with the previous correlation analysis.
6 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Assessing the joint cyber risk of network systems is an important
but challenging task. The challenge is primarily owing to three
components: network topology, attack propagation, and hetero-
geneities of components. These integrated components result in
interdependent cyber risks over the network. We propose a novel
backward elimination approach to efficiently computing the joint
distribution of the number of compromised components over the
network. The developed backward elimination approach not only
can provide explicit formulas for assessing the joint cyber risk of a
small network but also can be used to efficiently simulate the joint
cyber risk of a large-scale network when the explicit computing is
infeasible.
We specifically introduce a new concept of propagation depth
L, which describes the power of risk propagation or the de-
fensive power of a network. It is rigorously shown that when
the propagation depth L is larger, more nodes of all types over
the network are compromised in the sense of the multivariate
stochastic order. In particular, the number of compromised nodes
is always stochastically larger when L is larger for each type.
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Fig. 7. Contour plots of proportions of compromised nodes with (pI , pII , qI , qII) = (0.05, 0.15, 0.2, 0.3). The x-axis presents the proportion of type
I compromised nodes, and y-axis represents the proportion of type II compromised nodes.
We further demonstrate that when the compromise probabilities
(direct or indirect) are larger, more nodes are compromised. The
simulation study demonstrates that the number of compromised
nodes increases significantly when L increases from one to two.
The correlation between the proportions of compromised nodes
was positive, as shown by the simulation study.
The results developed in this work can be used to score a
cyber infrastructure with heterogeneous components, which can
be further used for the purpose of risk management or cyber
insurance. The current work can be extended in several directions.
For example, independence is assumed among all the propagation
events in the current work. It would be interesting to study how
the dependence among the propagation events would affect the risk
propagation over the network. Our preliminary study shows that
the dependence has a significant effect on the risk propagation.
The other direction is to consider the propagation depth L as a
random variable because L is indiscernible in certain practical
situations. The theory of mixture models may be utilized to
develop certain statistical inferences. Another possible study is
the exploration of other propagation models (e.g., SIS or SIR)
as the L-hop propagation model may not be suitable for certain
networks/scenarios. Then, the joint cyber risk could be assessed
based on the new propagation models, which would be different
from the current work.
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